# LSV Seminar

The LSV seminar takes place on Tuesday at 11:00 AM. The usual location is the conference room at Pavillon des Jardins (venue).
If you wish to be informed by e-mail about upcoming seminars, please contact Stéphane Le Roux and Matthias Fuegger.

The seminar is open to public and does not require any form of registration.

## Past Seminars

### Infinite sequential Nash equilibrium

- Date
- Tuesday, January 07 2014 at 11:00AM
- Place
- Salle de Conférence (Pavillon des Jardins)
- Speaker
- Stéphane Le Roux (TU Darmstadt)

In game theory, the concept of Nash equilibrium reflects the collective
stability of some individual strategies chosen by selfish agents. The
concept pertains to different classes of games, e.g. the sequential games,
where the agents play in turn. Two existing results are relevant here:
first, all finite such games have a Nash equilibrium (w.r.t. some given
preferences) iff all the given preferences are acyclic; second, all
infinite such games have a Nash equilibrium, if they involve two agents
who compete for victory and if the actual plays making a given agent win
(and the opponent lose) form a quasi-Borel set. This talk generalises
these two results via a single result. More generally, under the axiomatic
of Zermelo-Fraenkel plus the axiom of dependent choice (ZF+DC), it proves
a transfer theorem for infinite sequential games: if all two-agent
win-lose games that are built using a well-behaved class of sets have a
Nash equilibrium, then all multi-agent multi-outcome games that are built
using the same well-behaved class of sets have a Nash equilibrium,
provided that the inverse relations of the agents' preferences are
strictly well-founded.