The LSV seminar takes place on Tuesday at 11:00 AM. The usual location is the conference room at Pavillon des Jardins (venue). If you wish to be informed by e-mail about upcoming seminars, please contact Stéphane Le Roux and Matthias Fuegger.
The seminar is open to public and does not require any form of registration.
I will discuss first steps towards a more realistic treatment and logical formalization of the abilities of players to achieve objectives in multi-player games under incomplete, imperfect, or simply wrong information that they may have about the game and about the course of the play. In this talk, after some motivating examples I will introduce a variation of the multi-agent logic ATL as a logical framework for capturing the interplay between the dynamics of information and the dynamics of abilities of players. This framework takes into account both the a priori information of players with respect to the game structure and the empirical information that players develop over the course of an actual play. It associate with them respective information relations and notions of `a priori' and `empirical' strategies and strategic abilities. I will discuss the problem of model checking of statements formalized in the new logic under different assumptions about the abilities of the players to observe, remember, and reason.
Most of the talk will be based on a joint work with Peter Hawke (now at Stanford Univ.)