Nash equilibria in games on graphs with public signal monitoring


Patricia Bouyer-Decitre

LSV, CNRS & ENS Paris-Saclay, France




## What this talk is about

- pure Nash equilibria in game graphs
- imperfect information monitoring
- public signals
- computability of Nash equilibria



- Game graph G = (V, E)
- V partitioned into  $V_{\Diamond}$  and  $V_{\Box}$




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
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
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
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
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- The simplest: Nash equilibria

# Nash equilibria in turn-based games

### Nash equilibrium


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


is a Nash equilibrium with payoff (0, 1, 0)

# Nash equilibria in turn-based games

## Nash equilibrium


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



is not a Nash equilibrium

# Player A1 loses along that play

 $\psi_A$ : objective of player A







Main outcomes of Boolean Nash equilibria in turn-based games can be characterized by an LTL formula:

$$\Phi_{\mathsf{NE}} = \bigwedge_{A \in \mathsf{Agt}} \left( \neg \psi_A \Rightarrow \mathbf{G} \neg W_A \right)$$

where  $W_A$  is the set of winning states for A (should be precomputed).

## [UW11,Umm11]

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
 $\rightsquigarrow$  this is why we restrict to pure equilibria

Invisible actions in concurrent games [BBMU15]

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
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



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





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
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
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
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


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



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Solution via the suspect game abstraction, a structure to track suspect players

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
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
Solution via the suspect game abstraction, a structure to track suspect players

#### Can we add more partial information to that framework?

# Concurrent games with signals




# Concurrent games with signals



• Signal for player A<sub>1</sub>: • and •


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# Concurrent games with signals



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#### Public signal

Same signal to every player!

A concurrent game with signals is a tuple

 $\mathcal{G} = \langle V, \mathsf{v}_{\mathsf{init}}, \mathsf{Agt}, \mathsf{Act}, \Sigma, \mathsf{Allow}, \mathsf{Tab}, (\ell_{\mathcal{A}})_{\mathcal{A} \in \mathsf{Agt}}, (\mathsf{payoff}_{\mathcal{A}})_{\mathcal{A} \in \mathsf{Agt}} \rangle$ 

where:

- V is a finite set of vertices,
- $v_{\text{init}} \in V$  is the initial vertex,
- Agt is a finite set of players,
- Act is a finite set of actions,
- Σ is a finite alphabet,
- Allow:  $V \times Agt \rightarrow 2^{Act} \setminus \{\emptyset\}$  is a mapping indicating the actions available to a given player in a given state,
- Tab:  $V \times Act^{Agt} \rightarrow V$  associates, with a given state and a given move of the players (i.e., an element of  $Act^{Agt}$ ), the state resulting from that move,
- for every  $A \in \mathsf{Agt}$ ,  $\ell_A \colon \left(\mathsf{Act}^{\mathsf{Agt}} \times V\right) \to \Sigma$  is a signal,

• What player A sees from history  $h = v_0 \xrightarrow{m_0} v_1 \xrightarrow{m_1} \dots \xrightarrow{m_{k-1}} v_k$ :

$$\pi_{A}(h) = v_{0} \cdot m_{0}(A) \cdot \ell_{A}(m_{0}, v_{1}) \cdot m_{1}(A) \dots m_{k-1}(A) \cdot \ell_{A}(m_{k-1}, v_{k})$$

 $\rightsquigarrow$  perfect recall hypothesis

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• A strategy for player A is a (partial) function:

$$\sigma_{\mathcal{A}} \colon \mathcal{V} \cdot \left( \mathsf{Act}^{\mathsf{Agt}} \cdot \mathcal{V} \right)^* \to \mathsf{Act}$$

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 A strategy profile is a tuple σ<sub>Agt</sub> = (σ<sub>A</sub>)<sub>A∈Agt</sub> where σ<sub>A</sub> is a strategy for player A.

$$O_A : V \to \Sigma$$
  $\sigma_A : \Sigma^* \to \operatorname{Act}$ 

In most existing frameworks, strategies are defined through observation  $\ensuremath{\mathsf{maps}}$ 

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
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
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# Digression on payoff functions

#### Payoff functions

• Payoff function for player A ( $\mathbb{D} \subseteq \mathbb{R}$ ):

$$\mathsf{payoff}_{A} \colon V \cdot \left(\mathsf{Act}^{\mathsf{Agt}} \cdot V\right)^{\omega} \to \mathbb{D}$$

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• payoff<sub>A</sub> is privately visible whenever

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 implies  $\mathsf{payoff}_{\mathcal{A}}(\rho) = \mathsf{payoff}_{\mathcal{A}}(\rho')$ 

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• If signal  $\ell$  is public ( $\ell_A = \ell$  for every A), payoff<sub>A</sub> is publicly visible whenever

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 implies  $\mathsf{payoff}_{\mathcal{A}}(\rho) = \mathsf{payoff}_{\mathcal{A}}(\rho')$ 

Digression on payoff functions (cont'd)

#### Some payoff functions

• Boolean  $\omega$ -regular payoff function (for  $\Omega$ ):

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• Mean-payoff (limsup or liminf) w.r.t. weight function w:

$$\begin{cases} \underline{\mathsf{MP}}_w(\rho) = \liminf_{n \to \infty} \sum_{i=0}^n w \left( v_i \xrightarrow{m_i} v_{i+1} \right) \\ \overline{\mathsf{MP}}_w(\rho) = \limsup_{n \to \infty} \sum_{i=0}^n w \left( v_i \xrightarrow{m_i} v_{i+1} \right) \end{cases}$$

Digression on payoff functions (cont'd)

#### Some payoff functions


• Boolean  $\omega$ -regular payoff function (for  $\Omega$ ):

$$\mathsf{payoff}(
ho) = \left\{ egin{array}{cc} 1 & \mathsf{if} \ 
ho \in \Omega \\ 0 & \mathsf{otherwise} \end{array} 
ight.$$


• Mean-payoff (limsup or liminf) w.r.t. weight function w:

$$\begin{cases} \underline{\mathsf{MP}}_w(\rho) = \liminf_{n \to \infty} \sum_{i=0}^n w \left( v_i \xrightarrow{m_i} v_{i+1} \right) \\ \overline{\mathsf{MP}}_w(\rho) = \limsup_{n \to \infty} \sum_{i=0}^n w \left( v_i \xrightarrow{m_i} v_{i+1} \right) \end{cases}$$


For public visibility, we will assume that atomic propositions/atomic weights are defined w.r.t. the signal alphabet  $\Sigma$ .




• Three players concurrent game with public signal




- Three players concurrent game with public
- Consider the (partial) strategy profile  $\sigma_{Agt}$ . Can we complete it into a Nash equilibrium?




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
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
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- A<sub>1</sub> can deviate to v<sub>4</sub> and A<sub>3</sub> can deviate to v<sub>5</sub>: A<sub>2</sub> knows there has been a deviation, but (s)he doesn't whether A<sub>1</sub> or A<sub>3</sub> did so, and whether the game proceeds to v<sub>4</sub> or v<sub>5</sub>. On the other hand, both A<sub>1</sub> and A<sub>3</sub> know!



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- This is a non-profitable A<sub>1</sub>-deviation.
- No one (alone) can deviate to  $v_3$ .
- A1 can deviate to v4 and A3 can deviate to v5: A2 knows there has been a deviation, but (s)he doesn't whether A1 or A3 did so, and whether the game proceeds to v4 or v5. On the other hand, both A1 and A3 know! But if the game proceeds to v4, A3 can help A2 punishing A1, and if the game proceeds to v5, A1 can help A2 punishing A3.



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- This is a non-profitable  $A_1$ -deviation.
- No one (alone) can deviate to  $v_3$ .
- $A_1$  can deviate to  $v_4$  and  $A_3$  can deviate to  $v_5$ :  $A_2$  knows there has been a deviation, but (s)he doesn't whether  $A_1$  or  $A_3$  did so, and whether the game proceeds to  $v_4$  or  $v_5$ . On the other hand, both  $A_1$ and  $A_3$  know! But if the game proceeds to  $v_4$ ,  $A_3$  can help  $A_2$  punishing  $A_1$ , and if the game proceeds to  $v_5$ ,  $A_1$  can help  $A_2$ punishing  $A_3$ .

How to systematically track all undistinguishable behaviours and all individual deviations? Is that always possible?

## First undecidability results

One cannot decide the existence problem in games with signals with three players and publicly visible qualitative  $\omega$ -regular payoff functions.

 $\sim$  by reduction from the distributed synthesis problem (construction for reachability properties taken in [BK10])

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One cannot decide the constrained existence of a Nash equilibrium in a game with public signals, for a mixture of limsup and liminf mean-payoff functions which are privately visible. Even for two players.

 $\sim$  by reduction from blind mean-payoff games (proven undecidable in [DDG+10])

## The epistemic game abstraction

Inspired by:

- the standard powerset construction [Rei84]
- the epistemic unfolding for coordination/distributed synthesis [BKP11]
- the suspect game [BBMU15]
- the deviator game [Bre16]

[Rei84] Reif. The complexity of two-player games of incomplete information (J. Comp. and Syst. Sc.) [BKP11] Berwanger, Kaiser, Puchala. Perfect-information construction for coordination in games (FSTTCS'11) [BBMU15] Pure Nash equilibria in concurrent games (Log. Meth. in Comp. Sc.) [Bre16] Brenguier. Robust equilibria in mean-payoff games (FoSSaCS'16)

## The epistemic game abstraction


Inspired by:

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The idea is to track all possible undistinguishable behaviours, including the single-player deviations


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



Captures set of histories that some of the players do not distinguish.  $A_i$  cannot distinguish between the normal outcome (no deviation) and deviations of other players leading to some  $v \in V_{A_i}$  with  $j \neq i$  The epistemic game abstraction (cont'd)

Epistemic states (type-2)




Captures set of histories that some of the players do not distinguish.  $A_i$  cannot distinguish between the possible deviations of other players (but he knows there has been a deviation)








# Example of construction






























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### Properties of the epistemic game

• To every history H in the epistemic game, one can associate sets

- $concrete_{\perp}(H)$ : at most one concrete real history (if no deviation)
- $concrete_A(H)$ : all possible A-deviations
- $concrete(H) = \bigcup_{A \in Agt \cup \{\bot\}} concrete_A(H)$

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H history in the epistemic game. For every  $h_1 \neq h_2 \in concrete(H)$ ,  $h_1 \sim_A h_2$  iff  $h_1, h_2 \notin concrete_A(H)$ 

# Properties of the epistemic game (cont'd)

#### Winning condition for Eve

A strategy  $\sigma_{\text{Eve}}$  is said winning for payoff  $p \in \mathbb{R}^{\text{Agt}}$  from  $s_0$  whenever payoff( $concrete_{\perp}(out_{\perp}(\sigma_{\text{Eve}}, s_0))) = p$ , and for every  $R \in out(\sigma_{\text{Eve}}, s_0)$ , for every  $A \in \text{Agt}$ , for every  $\rho \in concrete_A(R)$ , payoff<sub>A</sub> $(\rho) \leq p_A$ .

# Properties of the epistemic game (cont'd)

### Winning condition for Eve (publicly visible payoffs)

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# Properties of the epistemic game (cont'd)

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
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
#### Proposition


There is a Nash equilibrium in  $\mathcal{G}$  with payoff p from  $v_0$  if and only if Eve has a winning strategy for p in  $\mathcal{E}_{\mathcal{G}}$  from  $s_0$ .

Player A<sub>1</sub> loses along that play

 $\psi_A$ : objective of player A







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One can decide the (constrained) existence of a Nash equilibrium in a game with public signal and publicly visible payoff functions associated with parity conditions in EXPSPACE. It is EXPTIME-hard.

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- EXPTIME-hardness: same proof as for the distributed synthesis problem [CDHR07]
- Can be extended to (finite) preorders over such objectives
- May even probably be extended to privately visible or invisible payoff functions (needs to be checked)

The mean-payoff payoff publicly visible functions can be used in the epistemic game, and the winning condition for Eve rewrites as:

A strategy for Eve is said winning for payoff  $p \in \mathbb{R}^{Agt}$  from  $s_0$  whenever  $MP(out_{\perp}(\sigma_{Eve}, s_0)) = p$ , and for every  $\rho \in out(\sigma_{Eve}, s_0)$ , for every  $A \in susp(\rho)$ ,  $MP_A(\rho) \le p_A$ .

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Inspired by [Bre16], we can reduce the constrained existence problem of a Nash equilibrium to the polyhedron problem [BR15].

### The polyhedron problem

In a multi-dimensional mean-payoff two-player turn-based game, the polyhedron problem aks, given a polyhedron  $\pi$ , whether there is a strategy for Eve which ensures a payoff vector which belongs to  $\pi$ .

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### Theorem

One can decide the (constrained) existence of a Nash equilibrium in a game with public signal and publicly visible mean-payoff payoff functions, in NP, with a coNEXPTIME oracle. This in particular can be solved in EXPSPACE. It is EXPTIME-hard.

# Conclusion

We have:

- proposed a framework for games over graphs with a public signal monitoring Note: framework inspired by [Tom98]
- proposed an abstraction called the epistemic game abstraction, which allows to characterize Nash equilibria in the original game
- used it to propose several decidability results.

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- proposed an abstraction called the epistemic game abstraction, which allows to characterize Nash equilibria in the original game
- used it to propose several decidability results.

#### We want:

- work out the precise complexities
- understand whether one can extend the approach to other communication architectures ([RT98]??)