

Optimal Timed Games


Patricia Bouyer

LSV – CNRS & ENS de Cachan – France

Timed automata

[Alur & Dill 90's]


x, y : clocks



Timed automata

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



	l_0	$\xrightarrow{\delta(4.1)}$	l_0	\xrightarrow{a}	l_1	$\xrightarrow{\delta(1.4)}$	l_1	\xrightarrow{b}	l_2
x	0		4.1		4.1		5.5		0
y	0		4.1		0		1.4		1.4

Timed automata


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
Model of priced timed automata

[HSCC'01]



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


- a configuration: (ℓ, v)
- two kinds of transitions:

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} (\ell, v) \xrightarrow{\delta(d)} (\ell, v + d) \\ (\ell, v) \xrightarrow{a} (\ell', v') \text{ where } \left\{ \begin{array}{l} v \models g \\ v' = [C \leftarrow 0]v \end{array} \right. \text{ for some } \ell \xrightarrow{g, a, C := 0} \ell' \end{array} \right.$$

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
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
$$\text{Cost} \left((\ell, v) \xrightarrow{\delta(d)} (\ell, v + d) \right) = P \cdot d \quad \text{Cost} \left((\ell, v) \xrightarrow{a} (\ell', v') \right) = p$$

$\text{Cost}(\rho) = \text{accumulated cost along run } \rho$

Model of priced timed automata (cont.)



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- **one player problems:**


- reachability with an optimization criterium on the price

[BFH+01a,BFH+01b,LBB+01,ALTP01]

- safety with a mean-cost optimization criterium

[BBL04]

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
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- **what if an opponent?**

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
- **what if an opponent?**

→ optimal reachability timed game

An example

c : controllable action


u : uncontrollable action



Question: what is the optimal price we can ensure in state ℓ_0 ?

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
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$$5t + 10(2 - t) + 1$$

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
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$$5t + 10(2 - t) + 1, \quad 5t + (2 - t) + 7$$

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
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
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
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
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- How to automatically compute such optimal prices?
- How to synthesize optimal strategies (if one exists)?

A hot topic!

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 - case of acyclic games

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
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
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- [Bouyer, Brihaye, Markey – Submitted to IPL, 2005]:
 - with three clocks, optimal cost is not computable

Do optimal strategies always exist?




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


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→ **no optimal strategy exists**, but rather a family $(f_\varepsilon)_{\varepsilon > 0}$ of ε -approximating strategies ($\text{cost}(f_\varepsilon) = 1 + \varepsilon$)


An encoding

Idea: transform the cost into a decreasing linear hybrid variable



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Theorem

For priced timed games (under some hypotheses),

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} \exists f \text{ winning strategy in } \mathcal{G} \\ \text{s.t. } \text{cost}(f, (\ell, v)) \leq \gamma \end{array} \right\} \iff (\ell, v, \text{cost} = \gamma) \text{ winning in } \mathcal{G}'$$

+ constructive proof

An encoding (2)

The set of winning states in \mathcal{G}' is upward-closed for the cost, *i.e.* of the form

$$\bigcup_{i \in I} (P_i \wedge \text{cost} \succ_i k_i) \quad (\text{with } \succ_i \text{ either } > \text{ or } \geq)$$

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Corollary

For priced timed games (under some hypotheses),

- *“reachable” optimal cost, or not ($\text{cost} \geq \gamma$ or $\text{cost} > \gamma$)*
- *existence of an optimal strategy decidable*

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
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Nature of the strategy:


- state-based for the hybrid game, thus **cost-dependent** for the timed game
- cost-dependence is unavoidable in general!
- cost-independent strategies for syntactical restrictions of the games
c: large constraints, u: strict constraints

Cost-dependence is unavoidable




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- **optimal cost:** 2
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
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
$$(\text{accumulated cost}) + d' \leq 2$$

Hypotheses for termination

- all clocks are bounded (not restrictive)
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Complexity bounds

[Alur, Bernadsky, Madhusudan 2004]


→ consider the k -step optimal game problem

Complexity bounds


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→ consider the k -step optimal game problem

- can be solved in **exponential time!**



(a) A nested partition



(b) A tube partition




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
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Idea:

- environment chooses $r \in [0, 1]$,
 - controller has to produce its binary encoding up to k digits
- Controller must have 2^k different strategies

Shape of the reduction

Original reduction: [Brihayé, Bruyère, Raskin 2005]

This reduction: [Bouyer, Brihayé, Markey 2005]

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- counter c_1 is encoded by a clock x_1 s.t. $x_1 = \frac{1}{2^{c_1}}$
- counter c_2 is encoded by a clock x_2 s.t. $x_2 = \frac{1}{3^{c_2}}$
- x_1 and x_2 will be alternatively x , y or z

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
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
Player 1 has a winning strategy with cost ≤ 3 iff the two-counter machine halts

Simulation of an incrementation

Instruction i : $c_1 ++$; goto instruction j




Adding x or $1 - x$ to the cost variable




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
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
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$\text{Add}^+(x, \{z\})$




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
Checking $y = 2x$



In W_1 , $\text{cost} = 2x_0 + (1 - y_0) + 2$.

In W_2 , $\text{cost} = 2(1 - x_0) + y_0 + 1$.

Checking $y = 2x$




In W_1 , $\text{cost} = 2x_0 + (1 - y_0) + 2$.

In W_2 , $\text{cost} = 2(1 - x_0) + y_0 + 1$.

- if $y_0 < 2x_0$, **player 2** chooses the first branch: in W_1 , $\text{cost} > 3$

Checking $y = 2x$




In W_1 , $\text{cost} = 2x_0 + (1 - y_0) + 2$.

In W_2 , $\text{cost} = 2(1 - x_0) + y_0 + 1$.

- if $y_0 < 2x_0$, **player 2** chooses the first branch: in W_1 , $\text{cost} > 3$
- if $y_0 > 2x_0$, **player 2** chooses the second branch: in W_2 , $\text{cost} > 3$

Checking $y = 2x$




In W_1 , $\text{cost} = 2x_0 + (1 - y_0) + 2$.


In W_2 , $\text{cost} = 2(1 - x_0) + y_0 + 1$.

- if $y_0 < 2x_0$, **player 2** chooses the first branch: in W_1 , $\text{cost} > 3$
- if $y_0 > 2x_0$, **player 2** chooses the second branch: in W_2 , $\text{cost} > 3$
- if $y_0 = 2x_0$, in W_1 or in W_2 , $\text{cost} = 3$.

How to get rid of tick clock u ?




How to get rid of tick clock u ?




We will ensure that:

- no cost is accumulated in D -states



How to get rid of tick clock u ?




We will ensure that:

- no cost is accumulated in D -states
- the delay between the A -state and the D -state is 1 t.u.




How to get rid of tick clock u ?




We will ensure that:

- no cost is accumulated in D -states
- the delay between the A -state and the D -state is 1 t.u.
 - the value of x in D is of the form $\frac{1}{2^n}$




How to get rid of tick clock u ?




We will ensure that:

- no cost is accumulated in D -states
- the delay between the A -state and the D -state is 1 t.u.
 - the value of x in D is of the form $\frac{1}{2^n}$
 - the value of y in D is of the form $\frac{1}{3^m}$




How to get rid of tick clock u ?




We will ensure that:

- no cost is accumulated in D -states
- the delay between the A -state and the D -state is 1 t.u.
 - the value of x in D is of the form $\frac{1}{2^n}$
 - the value of y in D is of the form $\frac{1}{3^m}$



Checking that x is of the form $\frac{1}{2^n}$



Conclusion

- Optimal cost is in general not computable in timed games.
- Under a strongly non-zero hypothesis for the cost, optimal cost is computable.
- A much involved complexity bound for the number of splittings of regions.
- Properties of winning strategies.

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- Properties of winning strategies.

Further work

- Compute effectively ε -optimal winning strategies.
- Further understand this problem: provide decidable subclasses?
- And from an algorithmics point of view, what can be done?
(integrate ideas from [ABM04] into encoding of [BCFL04]?)
- Adapt the forward algorithm of TiGA (game-extension of UPPAAL) [CDFLL05].
- Mean-cost optimal safety timed games.

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