Symbolic Verification of Cryptographic Protocols
Unbounded Process Verification with Proverif

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Introduction

Proverif

Protocol verifier developed by Bruno Blanchet at Inria Paris since 2000

- Analysis in formal model: secrecy, correspondences, equivalences, etc.
- Based on applied pi-calculus, Horn-clause abstraction and resolution
- The method is approximate but supports unbounded processes

Highly successful, works for most protocols including industrial ones: certified email, secure filesystem, Signal messaging, TLS draft, avionic protocols, etc.

These lectures

- Theory and practice of Proverif
- Secrecy, correspondences, equivalences
Terms

As usual in the formal model, messages are represented by terms

- built using **constructor symbols** from \( f \in \Sigma_c \)
- quotiented by an **equational theory** \( E \);
- notation: \( M \in \mathcal{M} = \mathcal{T}(\Sigma_c, \mathcal{N}) \).

In Proverif, computations are also modeled explicitly

- terms may also feature **destructor symbols** \( g \in \Sigma_d \);
- semantics given by **reduction rules** \( g(M_1, \ldots, M_n) \rightarrow M \);
- yields partial computation relation \( \Downarrow \) over \( \mathcal{T}(\Sigma, \mathcal{N}) \times \mathcal{M} \).

**Intuition:**

- use constructors for total functions,
- destructors when failure is possible/observable.
Example primitives

Symmetric encryption

type key.
fun enc(bitstring, key): bitstring.
reduc forall m:bitstring, k:key;
  dec(enc(m, k), k) = m.

Block cipher

type key.
fun enc(bitstring, key): bitstring.
fun dec(bitstring, key): bitstring.
equation forall m:bitstring, k:key; dec(enc(m, k), k) = m.
equation forall m:bitstring, k:key; enc(dec(m, k), k) = m.

Exercise: how would you model signatures?
Processes

Similar to the one(s) seen before, with a few key differences:

- let construct for evaluating computations (destructors);
- variables are typed (more on that later);
- private channels, phases, tables, events, etc.

Concrete syntax

\[
P, Q ::= 0 \mid (P \mid Q) \mid !P \mid \text{new n:t};P \\
\quad \mid \text{in}(c, x:t);P \mid \text{out}(c, u);P \\
\quad \mid \text{if } u = v \text{ then } P \text{ else } Q \\
\quad \mid \text{let } x = g(u_1, \ldots, u_N) \text{ in } P \text{ else } Q
\]

where \( u, v \) stand for constructor terms.

Reference for more details:

First examples

File structure

- **Declarations**: types, constructors, destructors, public and private data, processes...
- **Queries**, for now only secrecy: query attacker(s).
- **System specification**: the process/scenario to be analyzed.

Demo: `hello.pv` (basic file structure and use).

Demo: `types.pv` (on the role of types).
How does it work?

Horn clause modeling

 Encode the system as a set of Horn clauses $C$:
- attacker’s abilities, e.g. constructor $f$ yields
  \[ \forall M_1, \ldots, M_n. \ (\land_i \text{attacker}(M_i)) \Rightarrow \text{attacker}(f(M_1, \ldots, M_n)). \]
- protocol behaviour, e.g. $\text{in}(c, x).\text{out}(c, \text{senc}(x, sk))$ yields
  \[ \forall M. \ \text{attacker}(M) \Rightarrow \text{attacker}(\text{senc}(M, sk)). \]

Clauses over-approximate behaviours, $C \models \neg \text{attacker}(s)$ implies secrecy.

Automated reasoning

Entailment is **undecidable** for first-order Horn clauses but **resolution** (with strategies) provides practical **semi-decision algorithms**.

Proverif’s **possible outcomes**:
- may not terminate, may terminate with real or false attack;
- when it declares a protocol secure, it really is.
Attacker’s clauses (communication)

**Predicates**

Only two predicates (for now):

- \texttt{attacker}(M): attacker may know \( M \)
- \texttt{mess}(M, N): message \( N \) may be available on channel \( M \)

Variables range over messages; destructors not part of the logical language.

**Communication**

Send and receive on known channels:

\[
\forall M, N. \ \text{attacker}(M) \land \text{attacker}(N) \Rightarrow \text{mess}(M, N) \\
\forall M, N. \ \text{mess}(M, N) \land \text{attacker}(M) \Rightarrow \text{attacker}(N)
\]
Attacker’s clauses (deduction)

Constructors

For each $f \in \Sigma_c$ of arity $n$:
\[
\forall M_1, \ldots, M_n. (\wedge_i \text{attacker}(M_i)) \Rightarrow \text{attacker}(f(M_1, \ldots, M_n))
\]
Similar clauses are generated for public constants and new names.

Destructors

For each $g(M_1, \ldots, M_n) \to M$:
\[
\forall M_1, \ldots, M_n. (\wedge_i \text{attacker}(M_i)) \Rightarrow \text{attacker}(M)
\]

Equations

Proverif attempts to turn them to rewrite rules, treated like destructors.
For instance $senc(sdec(x, k), k) = x$ yields
\[
\forall M, N. \text{attacker}(sdec(M, N)) \wedge \text{attacker}(N) \Rightarrow \text{attacker}(M).
\]

Demo: set verboseClauses = short/explained.
Protocol clauses (informal)

Outputs

For each output, generate clauses:

- with all surrounding inputs as hypotheses;
- considering all cases for conditionals and evaluations.

Example:

\[
\text{in}(c, x) . \text{in}(c, y) . \text{if } y = n \text{ then let } z = \text{sdec}(x, k) \text{ in out}(c, \text{senc}(<z, n>, k))
\]

yields the following clause (assuming that \( c \) is public)

\[
\forall M. \text{attacker}(\text{senc}(M, k)) \land \text{attacker}(n) \Rightarrow \text{attacker}(\text{senc}(<M, n>, k))
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Protocol clauses (informal)

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**Replication**

Replication is ignored, as clauses can already be re-used in deduction.
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For each output, generate clauses:

- with all surrounding inputs as hypotheses;
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\]

Replication

Replication is ignored, as clauses can already be re-used in deduction.
For Proverif $P$ is the same as $!P$.
More generally $Q = C[P]$ is the same as $Q' = C[!P]$.

**Exercise**

Find $Q = C[P]$ and $Q' = C[!P]$ such that
- $Q$ ensures the secrecy of some value;
- $Q'$ does not.

Analyze $Q$ in Proverif; what happens?
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- $Q$ ensures the secrecy of some value;
- $Q'$ does not.

Analyze $Q$ in Proverif; what happens?

A possible solution: repeat.pv.
Protocol clauses (informal)

Nonces

Treated as (private) constructors taking surrounding inputs as argument.

For example, new a. in(c, x).new b. in(c, y). out(c, u(x, y, a, b)) yields \( \forall M, N. \text{attacker}(M) \land \text{attacker}(N) \Rightarrow \text{attacker}(u(M, N, a[], b[M])) \).

Exercise

In our process semantics, secrecy is not affected by the exchange of new and in operations. Find \( Q \) and \( Q' \) related by such exchanges such that

- both ensure the secrecy of some value;
- Proverif only proves it for \( Q \).
Protocol clauses (informal)

Nonces

Treated as (private) constructors taking surrounding inputs as argument.

For example, \( \text{new } a \text{. in}(c, x) \text{. new } b \text{. in}(c, y) \text{. out}(c, u(x, y, a, b)) \) yields
\[ \forall M, N. \text{attacker}(M) \land \text{attacker}(N) \Rightarrow \text{attacker}(u(M, N, a[], b[M])). \]

Exercise

In our process semantics, secrecy is not affected by the exchange of `new` and `in` operations. Find \( Q \) and \( Q' \) related by such exchanges such that
- both ensure the secrecy of some value;
- Proverif only proves it for \( Q \).

A possible solution: `freshness.pv`.
Exercise: Needham-Schroeder

The file nspk.pv contains a partial definition of the original Needham-Schroeder public-key protocol.

1. Complete the definition of the responder role.
2. Following what we did in lecture 2 (ded.pdf, slide 6) model the secrecy of $n_b$ when the responder (believes he) is interacting with the honest agent $A$.
4. Fix the protocol, check with Proverif.

A solution: nsl-secrecies.pv

The encoding is slightly more general than above. Demo HTML output with attack diagram.
Protocol clauses

\[
\begin{align*}
[0]^H_\rho &= \emptyset \\
[P \mid Q]^H_\rho &= [P]^H_\rho \cup [Q]^H_\rho \\
[!P]^H_\rho &= [P]^H_\rho
\end{align*}
\]
Protocol clauses

\[
\begin{align*}
[0]_\rho^H &= \emptyset \\
[P | Q]_\rho^H &= [P]_\rho^H \cup [Q]_\rho^H \\
[!P]_\rho^H &= [P]_\rho^H
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
[\text{in}(c, x). P]_\rho^H &= [P]_\rho^H \cup \{\text{mess}(c_\rho, x)\} \\
[\text{out}(c, u). P]_\rho^H &= \{H \Rightarrow \text{mess}(c_\rho, u_\rho)\} \cup [P]_\rho^H \wedge \text{mess}(c, x) \\
[\text{new } a. P]_\rho^H &= [P]_\rho^H \cup (a \mapsto a[p'_1, \ldots, p'_n]) \quad \text{where } H = \bigwedge_i \text{mess}(p_i, p'_i)
\end{align*}
\]
Protocol clauses

\[ \begin{align*}
[0]_\rho^H &= \emptyset & \quad [P \mid Q]_\rho^H &= [P]_\rho^H \cup [Q]_\rho^H & \quad [!]P]_\rho^H = [P]_\rho^H \\
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[\text{if } u = v \text{ then } P \text{ else } Q]_\rho^H &= [P]_{\rho \sigma}^H \cup [Q]_\rho^H & \quad \text{where } \sigma = \text{mgu}(u_\rho, v_\rho)
\end{align*} \]
Protocol clauses

\[
\begin{align*}
\[(0)\]_\rho^H &= \emptyset \\
\[(P | Q)\]_\rho^H &= \[(P)\]_\rho^H \cup \[(Q)\]_\rho^H \\
\[(!P)\]_\rho^H &= \[(P)\]_\rho^H \\
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{(in}(c, x). P\})_\rho^H &= \[(P)\]_\rho^H \cup \{\text{mess}(c_\rho, x)\} \\
\text{(out}(c, u). P\})_\rho^H &= \{H \Rightarrow \text{mess}(c_\rho, u_\rho)\} \cup \[(P)\]_\rho^{H \land \text{mess}(c, x)} \\
\text{(new a. } P\})_\rho^H &= \[(P)\]_\rho^{H + (a \mapsto a[p'_1, \ldots, p'_n]}) \\
\text{where } H &= \land_i \text{mess}(p_i, p'_i) \\
\text{(if } u = v \text{ then } P \text{ else } Q\})_\rho^H &= \[(P)\]_\rho^{H_\sigma} \cup \[(Q)\]_\rho^H \\
\text{where } \sigma &= \text{mgu}(u_\rho, v_\rho) \\
\text{(let } x = g(u_1, \ldots, u_n) \text{ in } P \text{ else } Q\})_\rho^H &= \bigcup_{(p'_i, \sigma) \in X} \[(P)\]_\rho^{H_\sigma + (x \mapsto p'_i)} \cup \[(Q)\]_\rho^H \\
\text{where } X &= \{(p'_i, \sigma) \mid g(p'_1, \ldots, p'_n) \rightarrow p'_i, \sigma = \text{mgu}(\land_i u_i \sigma = p'_i)\}
\end{align*}
\]

Example:

\text{in}(c, x).\text{in}(c, y).\text{if } y = n \text{ then let } z = \text{sdec}(x, k) \text{ in out}(c, \text{senc}(\langle z, n \rangle, k))
Semi-deciding non-derivability

Let $C$ be the encoding of a system.

**Proposition**

*If $m$ is not secret then (roughly) \( \text{attacker}(m) \) is derivable from $C$ using the consequence rule:*

\[
\begin{align*}
H_1\sigma & \\ \ldots \\ H_n\sigma & (\vec{H} \Rightarrow C) \in C \\
\hline
C\sigma
\end{align*}
\]

*Equivalently: if \( \text{attacker}(m) \) is not derivable, then $m$ is secret.*

**Goal**

Find a semi-decision procedure that allows to conclude often enough that a fact is not derivable from $C$. 
Conventions

Let $\phi = \forall M_1, \ldots, M_k. H_1 \land H_n \Rightarrow C$ be a clause.
Quantifiers may be omitted: free variables implicitly universally quantified.
Hypotheses’ order is irrelevant: $\{H_i\}_i \Rightarrow C$, where $\{H_i\}_i$ is a multiset.

Resolution with selection

For each clause $\phi$, let $\text{sel}(\phi)$ be a subset of its hypotheses.

$$
\frac{\phi = (H'_1 \land \ldots \land H'_m \Rightarrow C') \quad \psi = (H_1 \land \ldots \land H_n \Rightarrow C)}{(\land_i H'_i \land \land_{j \neq k} H_j \Rightarrow C) \sigma}
$$

With $\sigma = \text{mgu}(C', H_k)$, $\text{sel}(\phi) = \emptyset$, $H_k \in \text{sel}(\psi)$
and variables of $\phi$ and $\psi$ disjoint.
If $C'$ is a set of clauses, let $\text{solved}(C') = \{ \phi \in C' \mid \text{sel}(\phi) = \emptyset \}$.

**Proposition**

Let $C$ and $C'$ be two sets of clauses such that

- $C \subseteq C'$ and
- $C'$ is closed under resolution with selection.

If $F$ is derivable from $C$ then it is derivable from $\text{solved}(C')$, with a derivation of size (number of nodes) $\leq$ the original size.

**Goal:** saturate the initial set of clauses by resolution?
Resolution examples

- The selection strategy is crucial to obtain termination:

\[ \text{attacker}(x) \land \text{attacker}(y) \Rightarrow \text{attacker}(\text{aenc}(x, y)) \]
Resolution examples

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  \[
  \text{attacker}(x) \land \text{attacker}(y) \Rightarrow \text{attacker}(\text{aenc}(x, y))
  \]

- Redundant clauses are often generated:
  \[
  \text{attacker}(x_{pkb}) \land \text{attacker}(\text{aenc}(\langle na[x_{pkb}], x_{nb}, x_{pkb} \rangle, pk(sk_a)))) \\
  \Rightarrow \text{attacker}(\text{aenc}(x_{nb}, x_{pkb}))
  \]

  Assume 2\textsuperscript{nd} assumption selected, resolve against constructor clause.
Resolution examples

- The selection strategy is crucial to obtain termination:
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- Redundant clauses are often generated:
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  Assume 2\(^{nd}\) assumption selected, resolve against constructor clause.

- Termination not achieved in general, as seen in NS shared-key:
  \[
  B \rightarrow A : \text{senc}(n_b, k) \\
  A \rightarrow B : \text{senc}(n_b - 1, k)
  \]
Logical completeness (2)

Subsumption

\((\{H_i\}_i \Rightarrow C) \sqsubseteq (\{H'_j\}_j \Rightarrow C')\) if there exists \(\sigma\) such that

- \(C'\sigma = C\) and
- for all \(j\), \(H'_j\sigma = H_i\) for some \(i\).

Given a set of clauses, let \(\text{elim}(C)\) be a set of clauses such that for all \(\phi \in C\) there is \(\psi \in \text{elim}(C)\) such that \(\phi \sqsubseteq \psi\).

Saturation of an initial set of clauses \(C_0\)

1. initialize \(C := \text{elim}(C_0)\)
2. for each \(\phi\) generated from \(C\) by resolution, let \(C := \text{elim}(C \cup \{\phi\})\)
3. repeat step 2 until a fixed point is reached, let \(C'\) be the result.

Theorem

If \(F\) is derivable from \(C_0\) then it is derivable from \(\text{solved}(C')\).
Summing up: Proverif’s procedure

**Procedure for secrecy**

- Encode system as $C_0$.
- Saturate it to obtain $C'$.
- Declare secrecy of $m$ if solved($C'$) contains no clause with conclusion $\text{attacker}(m')$ with $m'\sigma = m$. 

Remarks
- Choice of selection function: at most one hypothesis, of the form attacker($u$) where $u$ is not a variable.
- Not covered here: treatment of equations, several optimizations.
- Differences with standard resolution: focus on deducible facts rather than consistency; factorisation not needed (Horn).
Summing up: Proverif’s procedure

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Termination and decidability

Proverif’s procedure works very well in practice, but offers no guarantee. This can be improved under additional assumptions.

Tagging

Secrecy is decidable for (reasonable classes of) tagged protocols.

- Blanchet & Podelski 2003: termination of resolution
- Ramanujan & Suresh 2003: decidability, but forbid blind copies

At most one blind copy

- Comon & Cortier 2003: decidability through (ordered) resolution

Illustration: resolution with selection on tagged NS shared-key
Correspondences

Roughly, express that if X happens then Y must have happened.

- If B thinks he’s completed the protocol with A, then A thinks he’s completed the protocol with B.

Events

Add events to the syntax of protocols:

(* Declaration *)
event evName(type1,..,typeName).
(* Use inside processes *)
P ::= ... | event evName(u1,..,uN); P

Semantics extended as follows:

\[(\text{event } E. \ P \ | \ Q, \Phi) \xrightarrow{\tau} (P \ | \ Q, \Phi)\]
Queries

Definition

The query

\[
\text{query } \ x_1:t_1, \ldots, x_N:t_K; \\
\text{event}(E(u_1, \ldots, u_N)) \implies \text{event}(E'(v_1, \ldots, v_M))
\]

holds if for all traces of the system

- if the trace ends with an event rule for an event of the form \( E(u_i)_i \),
- there is a prior execution of the rule for an event of the form \( E'(v_j)_j \).

Note that variables of \( u_i \) are universally quantified while those only occurring in \( v_j \) are existentially quantified.

Example

\[
\text{query } \ na:\text{bitstring}, \ nb:\text{bitstring}; \\
\text{event}(\text{endR}(pka,pkb,na,nb)) \implies \text{event}(\text{endI}(pka,pkb,na,nb)).
\]
Exercise: mutual authentication

Extend \texttt{nsl-secrecies.pv} to check mutual authentication:

1. Declare and emit an event \texttt{endResponder(pka, pkb, na, nb)} expressing that the responder, running with identity \texttt{pkb}, has completed an execution with \texttt{pka}, and that the negociated nonces are \texttt{na} and \texttt{nb}.

2. Do the same for the initiator.

3. Check that, when the responder has finished, an initiator has finished with the same parameters.

4. Consider the converse authentication property.
Exercise: injectivity

Proverif also allows to check injective correspondences:

query \ x_1 : t_1, \ldots, x_N : t_K;

\text{inj-event}(E(u_1, \ldots, u_N)) \implies \text{inj-event}(E'(v_1, \ldots, v_M))

holds if for all traces of the system there is an injective \( \phi \) such that

- if an event of the form \( E(u_i) \) is emitted at step \( \tau \),
- an event of the form \( E'(v_j) \) is emitted at step \( \phi(\tau) < \tau \).

Exercise:

1. Check that NSL satisfies mutual authentication in its injective form, which is the proper form.
2. Give a protocol that satisfies mutual authentication only in its non-injective form.
How does it work?

It is natural to encode events as outputs using a dedicated predicate. For example,

\[(\text{in}(c, x). \text{if } x = n_a \text{ then event } E)\]

would yield

\[(\text{attacker}(n_a) \Rightarrow \text{occurs}(E)).\]

Problem # 1

This approximate encoding would only express that the event may occur. When checking \(E \Rightarrow E'\) we cannot over-approximate \(E'\)!

- We will see how “must occur” can be encoded in the language of Horn clauses and resolution.
How does it work?

Problem # 2
Because of the approximate encoding of fresh names, messages in the logic do not correspond uniquely to messages in the semantics.

The process:
```plaintext
new d : channel;
! new a : bitstring;
in(c, x : bool);
if x = true then event A(a); out(d, ok) else
if x = false then in(d, x : bitstring); event B(a)
```

should not have any trace satisfying
```
query x : bitstring; event(B(x)) ==> event(A(x)).
```
How does it work?

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Because of the approximate encoding of fresh names, messages in the logic do not correspond uniquely to messages in the semantics.

The process

\[
\text{new } d : \text{channel};
\]

\[
! \text{new } a : \text{bitstring};
\]

\[
\text{in}(c, x : \text{bool});
\]

\[
\text{if } x = \text{true} \text{ then event } A(a); \text{out}(d, \text{ok}) \text{ else }
\]

\[
\text{if } x = \text{false} \text{ then in}(d, x : \text{bitstring}); \text{event } B(a)
\]

should not have any trace satisfying

\[
\text{query } x : \text{bitstring}; \text{event}(B(x)) \Rightarrow \text{event}(A(x)).
\]

We will ignore this problem in this lecture.
How does it work?

**Translation**

Use a predicate \(\text{begin}(\cdot)\) for events that must occur, and \(\text{end}(\cdot)\) for events that may occur.

Treat \(\text{event}(M)\) actions in processes using both may and must:

\[
\left[\text{event } M; P\right]_{\rho}^H = \left[ P \right]_{\rho}^{H \land \text{begin} (\text{event}(M\rho))} \cup \{H\rho \Rightarrow \text{end} (\text{event}(M\rho))\}
\]

We may look at `nspk-auth.pv` for concrete examples.

**Verification problem**

query \(x_1, \ldots, x_n; \text{event}(E(u_i)i) \implies \text{event}(E'(v_j)j)\)

\(\iff\) deriving \(\text{end}(E(u_i)i)\) requires to derive an instance of \(\text{begin}(E'(v_j)j)\)

(ignoring problem \# 2)

\(\iff\) for all sets \(E\) of \(\text{begin}(M)\) open facts, \(\text{end}(E(u_i)i)\) is derivable from \(C \cup E\) only if \(E\) contains \(\text{begin}(E'(v_j)j)\) (or a generalization of it)
Verifying correspondences through resolution

So we want to verify the following:

for all sets $E$ of $\text{begin}(M)$ open facts, $\text{end}(E(u_i)_i)$ is derivable from $C \cup E$

only if $E$ contains $\text{begin}(E'(v_j)_j)$ (or a generalization of it).

But we don’t know $E$ and can’t enumerate all of them!
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But we don’t know $E$ and can’t enumerate all of them!

**Key observation**

If we never select on $\text{begin}(M)$ hypotheses, saturating on $C \cup E$ is the same as saturating on $C$ and adding $E$ afterwards.
Verifying correspondences through resolution

So we want to verify the following:

for all sets \( E \) of \( \text{begin}(M) \) open facts, \( \text{end}(E(u_i)_i) \) is derivable from \( C \cup E \) only if \( E \) contains \( \text{begin}(E'(v_j)_j) \) (or a generalization of it).

But we don’t know \( E \) and can’t enumerate all of them!

Key observation

If we never select on \( \text{begin}(M) \) hypotheses, saturating on \( C \cup E \) is the same as saturating on \( C \) and adding \( E \) afterwards.

Procedure

- Build \( C \) by translating the process and adding attacker clauses.
- Get \( C' \) by saturating \( C \), without selecting \( \text{begin}(\cdot) \) hypotheses.
- Check that for all clauses \( \{H_i\}_i \Rightarrow C \in \text{solved}(C') \), and all \( \sigma \) such that \( C \sigma = \text{end}(E(u_i)_i) \sigma \), there exists \( i \) such that \( H_i \sigma \) is an instance of \( \text{begin}(E'(v_j)_j) \sigma \).
Definitions and usage in Proverif, on the blackboard.


**Exercise**

Consider the naive voting protocol where a voter sends his vote encrypted with the authority’s public key.

Can the vote be guessed? Model using diff-equivalence. Propose a fix.

**Exercise**

Consider the handshake protocol:

\[
A \rightarrow B : \text{senc}(n, pw) \\
B \rightarrow A : \text{senc}(\text{incr}(n), pw)
\]

Can \(pw\) be guessed? Model using diff-equivalence and a phase:

\[
\text{phase 1; new w; out}(c, \text{choice}[w, pw]).
\]

**Exercise**

CloudFlare’s Captcha alternative for Tor using blind tokens.