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DTSTART:19700329T020000
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SUMMARY:
Information Leakage Games
STATUS:CONFIRMED
ATTENDEE;CN="Catuscia Palamidessi
":
MAILTO:no@spam.com
DESCRIPTION:
We consider a game-theoretic setting to model the interplay
between attacker and defender in the context of information
flow\, and to reason about their optimal strategies. In cont
rast with standard game theory\, in our games the utility of
a mixed strategy is a convex function of the distribution o
n the defender's pure actions\, rather than the expected val
ue of their utilities. Nevertheless\, we show that the impor
tant properties of game theory\, notably the existence of a
Nash equilibrium\, still hold for our (zero-sum) leakage gam
es\, and we provide algorithms to compute the corresponding
optimal strategies. As typical in (simultaneous) game theory
\, the optimal strategy is usually mixed\, i.e.\, probabilis
tic\, for both the attacker and the defender. From the point
of view of information flow\, this was to be expected in th
e case of the defender\, since it is well known that randomi
zation at the level of the system design may help to reduce
information leaks. Regarding the attacker\, however\, this s
eems the first work (w.r.t. the literature in information fl
ow) proving formally that in certain cases the optimal attac
k strategy is necessarily probabilistic.
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Paris:20171010T110000
DURATION:PT1H
URL;VALUE=URI:http://www.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/Seminaires/?sem=201710101
100
UID:LSVsemLSV.201710101100@lsv.ens-cachan.fr
LOCATION:Auditorium Daniel Chemla (Bât. Institut D'Alembert)
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