# BAN simplified version of Yahalom

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**Summary:** An amended version of the Yahalom protocol, presented in the BAN logic paper. Symmetric keys and trusted server.

# Protocol specification (in common syntax)

```
A, B, S:
                 principal
Na, Nb:
                 number fresh
Kas, Kbs, Kab: key
A knows: A, B, S, Kas
B knows:
          B, S, Kbs
S knows: S, A, B, Kas, Kbs
1.
      Α
         ->
             В
                 :
                       A, Na
         ->
             S
                       B, Nb, \{A, Na\}Kbs
3.
      S
                       Nb, \{B, Kab, Na\}Kas, \{A, Kab, Nb\}Kbs
        ->
             Α
        ->
             В
                       \{A, Kab, Nb\}Kbs, \{Nb\}Kab\}
```

### Description of the protocol rules

Compared to the original version of the Yahalom protocol, the nonce Nb is added to the second cipher of message 3, to prevent a malicious A to reuse an old value of Kab.

Also, Nb is sent in cleartext in message 2, which makes possible the attacks below.

## Requirements

See Yahalom.

### References

This simplified version of the Yahalom protocol was proposed in [BAN89].

# Claimed proofs

[BAN89]

#### Claimed attacks

Replay attack with interleaving and type error in [Syv94].

```
i.1.
             Α
                  ->
                       I(B)
                                    A, Na
 i.2.
             В
                       I(S)
                                    B, Nb, \{A, Na\}Kbs
                  ->
 ii.1.
           I(A)
                  ->
                         В
                                    A, Na, Nb
                                                                In the mes-
 ii.2.
             В
                       I(S)
                                    B, Nb, \{A, Na, Nb\}Kbs
                  ->
 i.3.
                                     Omitted
 i.4.
           I(A)
                  ->
                         В
                                    {A, Na, Nb}Kbs, {Nb}Na
sage 1 of session ii, the pair Na, Nb is used as a nonce N'a, and in the last
message of session i, Na is used as the key Kab.
```

A second replay attack is described in the same paper [Syv94].

```
i.1.
            Α
                  ->
                      I(B)
                                   A, Na
ii.1.
           I(B)
                  ->
                        Α
                                   B, Na
                                   A, N'a, {B, Na}Kas
ii.2.
            Α
                      I(S)
                  ->
iii.1.
                                   Omitted
iii.2.
          I(A)
                  ->
                        S
                                   A, Na, \{B, Na\}Kas
iii.3.
            S
                      I(B)
                                   Na, {A, Kab, Na}Kbs, {B, Kab, Na}Kas
                  ->
                              :
i.2.
                                   Omitted
                                   Ni, \{B, Kab, Na\}Kas, \{A, Kab, Na\}Kbs
i.3.
           I(S)
                  ->
                        Α
i.4.
                                   \{A, Kab, Na\}Kbs, \{Ni\}Kab\}
            Α
                  ->
                      I(B)
```

#### See also

Yahalom,

Paulson's strengthened version of Yahalom.

## Citations

- [BAN89] Michael Burrows, Martin Abadi, and Roger Needham. A logic of authentication. Technical Report 39, Digital Systems Research Center, february 1989.
- [Syv94] Paul Syverson. A taxonomy of replay attacks. In *Proceedings of the* 7th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, pages 131–136. IEEE Computer Society Press, 1994.