

## Schnorr's Protocol

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**Summary:** The Schnorr protocol is described by R. Cramer, I. Damgård and B. Schoenmakers in [CDS94].

### Protocol specification (in common syntax)

A, B :                principal  
Na, Nb :             fresh number  
Sa :                  private key  
Pa = exp(g,Sa) :    public key

A chooses Na and computes  $a = \text{exp}(g, Na)$

1.    A  $\rightarrow$  B :    a

B chooses Nb

2.    B  $\rightarrow$  A :    Nb

A computes  $r = Na + Nb \times Sa$

3.    A  $\rightarrow$  B :    r

B checks that  $\text{exp}(g, r) = a \times \text{exp}(Pa, Nb)$

### Description of the protocol rules

A zero-knowledge protocol is designed for convincing the verifier of the validity of a given statement, without releasing any knowledge beyond the validity of the statement. This concept was introduced in [GMR85]. An overview can be found in [Gol01]. We present the Schnorr protocol which is described by R. Cramer, I. Damgård and B. Schoenmakers in [CDS94] and which uses this method.

The  $+$ ,  $\times$  and  $\text{exp}$  symbols denote respectively addition, multiplication and modular exponentiation.

Details of the computation done by B at the last step of the protocol:

$$\begin{aligned} & a \times \text{exp}(Pa, Nb) \\ = & \text{exp}(g, Na) \times \text{exp}(\text{exp}(g, Sa), Nb) \\ = & \text{exp}(g, Na) \times \text{exp}(g, Sa \times Nb) \\ = & \text{exp}(g, Na + Sa \times Nb) \\ = & \text{exp}(g, r) \end{aligned}$$

## Requirements

A wants to prove his identity to B by showing him that he knows  $S_a$  without revealing it.

## References

[CDS94]

## Citations

- [CDS94] R. Cramer, I. Damgård, and B. Schoenmakers. Proofs of partial knowledge and simplified design of witness hiding protocols. In *Proc. 14th Annual International Cryptology Conference (CRYPTO'94)*, volume 963 of *LNCS*, pages 174–187, Santa Barbara (California, USA), 1994. Springer-Verlag.
- [GMR85] S. Goldwasser, S. Micali, and C. Rackoff. The knowledge complexity of interactive proof-systems. In *Proc. 17th annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing*, pages 291–304. ACM Press, 1985.
- [Gol01] O. Goldreich. *Foundations of Cryptography*. Cambridge University Press, 2001.