LSV Seminar

The LSV seminar takes place on Tuesday at 11:00 AM. The usual location is the conference room at Pavillon des Jardins (venue). If you wish to be informed by e-mail about upcoming seminars, please contact Stéphane Le Roux and Matthias Fuegger.

The seminar is open to public and does not require any form of registration.

Past Seminars

The Complexity of Nash Equilibria in Stochastic Games

Visit website for this news | Export event in iCalendar format

 Michael Ummels
Tuesday, December 08 2009 at 11:00AM
Salle de Conférence (Pavillon des Jardins)
Michael Ummels (RWTH Aachen)

We analyse the computational complexity of finding Nash equilibria in simple stochastic multiplayer games. We show that restricting the search space to equilibria whose payoffs fall into a certain interval may lead to undecidability. In particular, we prove that the following problem is undecidable: Given a game G, does there exist a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of G where player 0 wins with probability 1. Moreover, this problem remains undecidable if it is restricted to strategies with (unbounded) finite memory. However, if mixed strategies are allowed, decidability remains an open problem. One way to obtain a provably decidable variant of the problem is restricting the strategies to be positional or stationary. For the complexity of these two problems, we obtain a common lower bound of NP and upper bounds of NP and PSPACE respectively.

About LSV


Export agenda in iCalendar format | Past seminars

Tue, Jan 22
Tue, Jan 29
Tue, Feb 5
Tue, Feb 19

Past seminars