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Strategic transmission of information

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 Maël Le Treust
Date
Le mardi 20 mars 2018 à 11:00
Lieu
Salle de Conférence (Pavillon des Jardins)
Orateur
Maël Le Treust (ETIS, Cergy)

What information one has to transmit when the receiver has a different objective from the sender ? Originally in the Economics literature, the problem of ``Strategic Information Transmission'' arises in decentralized networks when the users are considered as players, that choose autonomously a transmission scheme in order to maximize their own utility function. The key difference with conventional communication paradigm is that the meaning of the information symbol has to be considered carefully. Indeed, each information might have a different impact on the utility functions of the users, hence it has to be compressed and transmitted accordingly. Instead of ensuring reliable transmission, the goal of the encoder is to manipulate the posterior beliefs of the decoder in order to influence its action. We provide a unified approach to this problem by generalizing the Rate-Distortion results in Information Theory and the Persuasion results in Game Theory. By using the tool of ``Empirical Coordination'', we characterize the optimal ``Strategic Transmission’’ in terms of a concavification over the space of the posterior beliefs, under a mean entropy constraint.


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