

Reduction of equational theories for verification of trace equivalence:  
re-encryption, associativity and commutativity

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# Process equivalence and formal verification

**Authentication** [Abadi, Gordon; Information and Computation'99]:

$$P_{\text{impl}} \sim P_{\text{spec}}$$

**Strong secrecy** [Blanchet; Security and Privacy'04]:

$$P[s] \sim P[s']$$

**Guessing attacks** [Corin, Doumen, Etalle; Elec. TCS'05]:

$$\nu s. P \sim P$$

**Vote privacy** [Kremer, Ryan; ESOP'05]:

$$P[ V(\text{id}_1, a) \mid V(\text{id}_2, b) ] \sim P[ V(\text{id}_1, b) \mid V(\text{id}_2, a) ]$$

**Unlinkability** [Arapinis, Chothia, Ritter, Ryan; CSF'10]:

$$P[Q] \sim P[!Q]$$

# Automated verification of process equivalence

- ▶ Deciding framed bisimilarity [Huttel; Elec.TCS'02]
- ▶ Automatic testing equivalence verification from spi-calculus specifications [Durante, Sisto, Valenzano; ACM Trans.SEM'03]
- ▶ Deciding security of protocols against off-line guessing attacks [Baudet; ACM CCS'05].
- ▶ Automated verification of selected equivalences for the applied pi-calculus [Blanchet, Abadi, Fournet; LICS'05]
- ▶ A method for proving observational equivalence [Cortier, Delaune; CSF'09]
- ▶ Automating open bisimulation checking for the spi calculus [Tiu,Dawson; CSF'10]
- ▶ Automating security analysis: symbolic equivalence of constraint systems [Cheval, Comon, Delaune; IJCAR'10]
- ▶ Trace equivalence decision: negative tests and non-determinism [Cheval, Comon, Delaune; ACM CCS'11]
- ▶ Automated verification of equivalence properties of cryptographic protocols [Chadha, Ciobâcă, Kremer; ESOP'12]

# Automated verification of process equivalence

Examples not covered by current tools and algorithms:

## Re-encryption

$$\mathcal{E}_{\text{renc}} : \begin{cases} \text{renc}(\text{enc}(x, y, z), z') = \text{enc}(x, y, z \oplus z') \\ \text{renc}(\text{renc}(x, z), z') = \text{renc}(x, z \oplus z') \end{cases}$$

## Associativity and commutativity

$$\mathcal{E}_{\oplus} : \begin{cases} x \oplus (y \oplus z) = (x \oplus y) \oplus z \\ x \oplus y = y \oplus x \end{cases}$$

## Homomorphic encryption

$$\mathcal{E}_{\text{hom}} : \text{enc}(x_1, y, z_1) \otimes \text{enc}(x_2, y, z_2) = \text{enc}(x_1 \oplus x_2, y, z_1 \oplus z_2)$$

# Automated verification of process equivalence

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# Research goal: reduction of equational theories

$$\mathcal{E}_c \rightsquigarrow \mathcal{E}_r$$

- ▶ Soundness

$$P \sim_{\mathcal{E}_r} Q \implies P \sim_{\mathcal{E}_c} Q$$

- ▶ Completeness

$$P \sim_{\mathcal{E}_c} Q \implies P \sim_{\mathcal{E}_r} Q$$

## Re-encryption, associativity and commutativity

$$\mathcal{E}_{\text{DY}} = \begin{cases} \text{dec}(\text{enc}(x, \text{pub}(y), z), y) = x \\ \pi_1(\langle x, y \rangle) = x \\ \pi_2(\langle x, y \rangle) = y \end{cases}$$

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$$\mathcal{E}_{\text{ver}} = \begin{cases} \text{checkDec}(\text{decPf}(\text{enc}(x, \text{pub}(y), z), x, y), \\ \quad \text{enc}(x, \text{pub}(y), z), x, \text{pub}(y))) = \text{ok} \\ \text{checkMix}(\text{mixPf}(x, y, \text{renc}(x, z_x), \text{renc}(y, z_y), z_x, z_y), \\ \quad x, y, \text{renc}(x, z_x), \text{renc}(y, z_y))) = \text{ok} \\ \text{checkMix}(\text{mixPf}(x, y, \text{renc}(y, z_y), \text{renc}(x, z_x), z_y, z_x), \\ \quad x, y, \text{renc}(y, z_y), \text{renc}(x, z_x))) = \text{ok} \end{cases}$$

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## Re-encryption, associativity and commutativity

$$\mathcal{E}_{DY} = \begin{cases} \text{dec}(\text{renc}^n(\text{enc}(x, \text{pub}(y), z), z_1, \dots, z_n), y) = x \\ \pi_1(\langle x, y \rangle) = x \\ \pi_2(\langle x, y \rangle) = y \end{cases}$$

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# Reduction of equational theories

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**Main theorem:**  $P \sim_{\mathcal{E}_n} Q \implies P \sim_{\mathcal{E}} Q$

where  $n = 2 * \max(\#_{\text{renc}}(P), \#_{\text{renc}}(Q)) + 1$

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Main assumptions:

- ▶  $\exists R \in \text{sp}(P, Q) \implies \text{renc} \notin \text{sig}(R)$
- ▶  $f \notin \text{sig}(P) \cup \text{sig}(\mathcal{E} \setminus \{\mathcal{E}_{\text{renc}}, \mathcal{E}_{\oplus}\})$

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Assumptions are satisfied by e.g. electronic voting protocols:

- ▶ bound on the number of processed ballots
- ▶ arithmetic operations confined to cryptographic primitives

## Technical details

# Term algebra and static equivalence

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} \mathcal{N} = a, b, m, n, r, k_1, k_2, \dots \\ \mathcal{X} = x, y, z, \dots \\ \mathcal{F} = \text{enc}, \text{dec}, \text{pub}, \text{renc}, \langle \cdot, \cdot \rangle, \dots \end{array} \right\} \rightsquigarrow \mathcal{T}(\mathcal{F}, \mathcal{N}, \mathcal{X})$$

$$u_1 = v_1, \dots, u_k = v_k \rightsquigarrow \mathcal{E}$$

Frame:

$$\begin{aligned} \phi &= \nu \tilde{n}. \{x_1 \mapsto u_1, \dots, x_n \mapsto u_n\} \\ \psi &= \nu \tilde{n}. \{x_1 \mapsto t_1, \dots, x_n \mapsto t_n\} \end{aligned}$$

Recipes

$$\mathfrak{R}(\phi) = \mathcal{T}(\mathcal{F}, \mathcal{N} \setminus \tilde{n}, \{x_1, \dots, x_n\})$$

Static equivalence:  $\phi \stackrel{s}{\sim} \psi$  iff

- ▶  $\text{dom}(\phi) = \text{dom}(\psi)$  and
- ▶  $\forall \zeta_1, \zeta_2 \in \mathfrak{R}(\phi).$

$$\zeta_1[\phi] =_{\mathcal{E}} \zeta_2[\phi] \Leftrightarrow \zeta_1[\psi] =_{\mathcal{E}} \zeta_2[\psi]$$

# Process calculus and trace equivalence

$P, Q, R ::=$

$0$

null process

$P \mid Q$

parallel composition

$!P$

replication

$\nu n.P$

name restriction

if  $u = v$  then  $P$  else  $Q$

conditional

$c(x).P$

message input

$\bar{c}\langle u \rangle.P$

message output

$\{x \mapsto u\}$

frame element



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$c(x).P$	message input
$\bar{c}\langle u \rangle.P$	message output
$\{x \mapsto u\}$	frame element

## Traces:

$$\begin{aligned}\tau &= P_0 \xrightarrow{\alpha_0} P_1 \xrightarrow{\alpha_1} \dots P_{n-1} \xrightarrow{\alpha_{n-1}} P_n \\ &\quad \alpha_i \in \{\bar{c}\langle x_i \rangle, c(\zeta_i), \epsilon \mid \zeta_i \in \mathfrak{R}(\text{fr}(P_i))\} \\ \text{obs}(\tau) &= \alpha_{i_1} \dots \alpha_{i_n} \text{ if } \alpha_1 \dots \alpha_n = \epsilon^* \alpha_{i_1} \epsilon^* \dots \alpha_{i_n} \epsilon^* \\ \text{fr}(\tau) &= \text{fr}(P_n)\end{aligned}$$

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## Trace equivalence

$$\begin{aligned}\tau_1 \sim_{\mathcal{E}} \tau_2 &\Leftrightarrow \text{obs}(\tau_1) = \text{obs}(\tau_2) \ \& \ \text{fr}(\tau_1) \stackrel{s}{\sim}_{\mathcal{E}} \text{fr}(\tau_2) \\ P \sim_{\mathcal{E}} Q &\Leftrightarrow \text{tr}(P) \sim_{\mathcal{E}} \text{tr}(Q)\end{aligned}$$

# Reduction of equational theories

$$\mathcal{E} = \mathcal{E}_0 \cup \mathcal{E}_{\text{renc}} \cup \mathcal{E}_{\oplus} \rightsquigarrow \mathcal{E}_n$$

**Main theorem:**  $P \sim_{\mathcal{E}_n} Q \implies P \sim_{\mathcal{E}} Q$

where  $n = 2 * \max(\#_{\text{renc}}(P), \#_{\text{renc}}(Q)) + 1$

Scheme of the proof:

$$P \sim_{\mathcal{E}_n} Q \implies P \simeq_{\mathcal{E}_n} Q \implies P \simeq_{\mathcal{E}} Q \implies P \sim_{\mathcal{E}} Q$$

**Main assumptions:**

- ▶  $\text{!}S \in \text{sp}(P, Q) \implies \text{renc} \notin \text{sig}(S)$
- ▶  $\oplus \notin \text{sig}(P, Q)$  and  $\oplus \notin \text{sig}(\mathcal{E}_0)$

# Reduction of the set of traces

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Locality function  $\mathcal{L}$ :  $\mathcal{L}(\phi) \subseteq \mathfrak{R}(\phi)$

Local static equivalence:  $\phi \sim \psi$  iff

- ▶  $\text{dom}(\phi) = \text{dom}(\psi)$
- ▶  $\forall \zeta_1, \zeta_2 \in \mathcal{L}(\phi) \cap \mathcal{L}(\psi). \zeta_1[\phi] =_{\mathcal{E}} \zeta_2[\phi] \Leftrightarrow \zeta_1[\psi] =_{\mathcal{E}} \zeta_2[\psi]$

Local traces:

$$P_0 \xrightarrow{\alpha_0} P_1 \dots \xrightarrow{\alpha_{n-1}} P_n$$
$$\alpha_i \in \{\bar{c}\langle x_i \rangle, c(\zeta_i), \epsilon \mid \zeta_i \in \mathcal{L}(\text{fr}(P_i))\}$$

Local trace equivalence:  $P \simeq_{\mathcal{E}} Q \Leftrightarrow \text{tr}_{\mathcal{L}}(P) \sim_{\mathcal{E}} \text{tr}_{\mathcal{L}}(Q)$

## Scheme of the proof

$$P \sim_{\varepsilon_n} Q \implies P \simeq_{\varepsilon_n} Q \implies P \simeq_{\varepsilon} Q \implies P \sim_{\varepsilon} Q$$

## Reduction of the set of traces

$$P \sim Q \implies P \simeq_{\mathcal{L}} Q$$

$$P \simeq_{\mathcal{L}} Q \implies P \sim Q$$

# Reduction of the set of traces

**Proposition 1.** Let  $\mathcal{L}$  be a locality function such that, for all frames  $\phi, \psi$  that are issued from two statically equivalent traces, we have  $\mathcal{L}(\phi) = \mathcal{L}(\psi)$ . Then, for all plain processes  $P, Q$ , we have

$$P \sim Q \implies P \simeq_{\mathcal{L}} Q$$

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**Normalization function**  $N : \mathfrak{R}(\phi) \mapsto \mathcal{L}(\phi)$

$$\forall \zeta \in \mathfrak{R}(\phi). \quad N(\zeta) \in \mathcal{L}(\phi) \ \& \ N(\zeta)[\phi] =_{\varepsilon} \zeta[\phi]$$

$$P \simeq_{\mathcal{L}} Q \implies P \sim Q$$

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**Proposition 2.** Let  $\mathcal{L}$  be a locality function such that, for all frames  $\phi, \psi$  that are issued from two  $\mathcal{L}$ -statically equivalent and  $\mathcal{L}$ -local traces, there exists a normalization function  $N \in \text{norm}_{\mathcal{L}}(\phi) \cap \text{norm}_{\mathcal{L}}(\psi)$ . Then, for all processes  $P, Q$ , we have

$$P \simeq_{\mathcal{L}} Q \implies P \sim Q$$

## Scheme of the proof

$$P \sim_{\varepsilon_n} Q \implies P \simeq_{\varepsilon_n} Q \implies P \simeq_{\varepsilon} Q \implies P \sim_{\varepsilon} Q$$

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$$P \sim_{\mathcal{E}_n} Q \implies P \simeq_{\mathcal{E}_n} Q \implies P \simeq_{\mathcal{E}} Q \implies P \sim_{\mathcal{E}} Q$$

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{renc}, \oplus}(\phi) = \mathcal{L}_{\text{renc}}(\phi) \cap \mathcal{L}_{\oplus}(\phi)$$

# Locality for associativity and commutativity

Goal: ensure a canonical use of  $\oplus$

Total ordering on recipes:  $\prec$

Minimal recipes:  $t \mapsto \min_{\mathfrak{R}}(t)$

Convergent rewrite system:  $\mathcal{E} \setminus \mathcal{E}_{\oplus} \rightsquigarrow \mathcal{R}$

Locality function for AC:  $\forall \zeta \in \text{st}(\mathcal{L}_{\oplus}(\phi))$

$$\begin{aligned} \zeta[\phi] \downarrow_{\mathcal{R}} &= C_{\oplus}[t_1, \dots, t_n] \text{ and } \top(t_1) \neq \oplus, \dots, \top(t_n) \neq \oplus \\ &\implies \\ &1. \quad C_{\oplus} = (\epsilon_1 \oplus (\dots \oplus (\epsilon_{n-1} \oplus \epsilon_n) \dots)) \\ &2. \quad \min_{\mathfrak{R}}(t_1) \prec \dots \prec \min_{\mathfrak{R}}(t_n) \end{aligned}$$

Normalization function:  $N_{\oplus}(\zeta) = (\zeta_1 \oplus (\dots \oplus (\zeta_{n-1} \oplus \zeta_n)))$

# Locality for re-encryption

**Goal:** bound the number of re-encryptions applied to any ciphertext

Recipes to avoid:

$RR(\phi)$  = “nested re-encryptions by the environment”

**Example:**  $\text{renc}(C[\text{renc}(\zeta_1, \zeta_2)], \zeta_3)$

**Locality function for re-encryption:**  $RR(\phi) \cap \text{st}(\mathcal{L}_{\text{renc}}(\phi)) = \emptyset$

**Normalization function:**  $N_{\text{renc}}$

**Example:**  $N_{\text{renc}}(\text{renc}(C[\text{renc}(\zeta_1, \zeta_2)], \zeta_3)) = \text{renc}(\zeta_1, \zeta_2 \oplus \zeta_3)$

# Reduction of equational theories (last step)

$$P \simeq_{\mathcal{E}_n} Q \implies P \simeq_{\mathcal{E}} Q$$

Some ingredients:

- ▶  $u =_{\mathcal{E}} v \Leftrightarrow u =_{\mathcal{E} \setminus \mathcal{E}_{\oplus}} v' \ \& \ v' =_{\mathcal{E}_{\oplus}} v$
- ▶ Randoms used by the protocol are kept secret
- ▶ Re-encryption witness and re-encryption depth
- ▶  $u \rightarrow_{\mathcal{R}} v \implies u \rightarrow_{\mathcal{R}_n} v\rho$

# Application

Vote privacy in Prêt à Voter with ProVerif